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ABSTRACT 
This paper reviews recent search equilibrium models to 
see whether usable policy instruments can be derived from 
them. It concludes that the strength of the assumptions that 
many of these models make largely precludes such derivations, 
and ends by sketching possible lines of research that have 
both positive interest and the potential to yield helpful 
normative conclusions. 
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I 
Ever since the pioneering work of Stigler (1961) and the 
provocative survey b y  Rothschild (1973), economists have clear ly 
recognized that general equilibrium models yield competitive 
equilibria only by making strong assumptions about the extent of 
information available to market participants. These models also seem 
inconsistent with observed data; for they predict single price 
equilibria while price dispersion that is not accounted for by product 
or contract term heterogeniety or by price discrimination apparently 
is pervasive. In response to these perceived defects in the 
neoclassical models, theorists in recent years have developed a family 
of ' ' search equilibrium models' ' that presuppose product homogenicty 
and the absence of price discrimination, but whioh also assume that 
information acquisition costs are positive for at least a subset of 
buyers. On the basis of these and other assumptions, the mode 1 s 
attempt to show how price dispersion equilibria can arise solely as a 
result of the strategies that firms and consumers pursue. One author 
summarized the results: "If information is costly, each small firm 
obtains market power, ' '  so that ' ' The relevant market structure with 
imperfect information is .lliU perfect competition .ll..!ll rather 
monopolistic competition.••1 
2 
The <lefects of the neoclassical 1r.odels are also interesting 
norniatively. To see why, suppose that ( i) pro<lucts and contract terms 
in a given market are homogeneous; (ii) no price discrimination 
occurs; (iii) entry is free, so that in equilibrium all firms earn 
zero expected profits; (iv) goods are homogeneous; and, (v) as a 
result of insufficient consumer search, three prices obtain: S2 , where 
price equals long run average cost, S3 and S4. An equilibrium of this 
sort potentially is inferior to a competitive equilibrium in which all 
firms charge t2 . This is because if the government were to cause 
search to be increased such that price was driven down to t2 , 
consumers would be made better off but firms no worse off. If this 
welfare gain would exceed the costs of such regulation, the state 
should regulate. That searoh costs are positive, then, is of 
no rmative interest because those costs could generate supracompeti tive 
prices. Pol icy analysts thus should want to know: (a) when is 
insufficient search, rather than other factors, likely to cause 
supracompetitive prices? (b ) how can markets that behave ba<lly for 
information reasons best be moved toward competitive equilibria? (c ) 
when are the costs of regulation to cure this sort of market failure 
likely to exceed the welfare gains? 
Some theorists and most deoisionmakers asswne that the answer 
to the first question is ' ' often, especially i'n consumer markets' ' ,  a 
position that the evidence fails convincingly to sustain. 2 Economists 
also seldom ask the last two questions. 3 And decisionmakers have 
ignored the last question while transmuting the secon<l into the 
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inquiry whether the '' typical' ' consumer lacks .Jlli.Y information that he 
or she would find useful in making a ''rational' ' choice. If so, an 
information problem justifying regulation is assumed to exist (Landers 
1977; Landers and Rohner 1979) . The economists' concentration on 
theory and the policymakers' ignorance of economics thus has produced 
a large amount of regulation, much of which might be unnecessary and 
most of which is expensive to administer and obey. 
The search equilibrium models described above focus attention 
on the strength of the informational assumptions that the neoclassical 
models make and 011 the potentially unpleasant normative consequences 
of relaxing those assumptions. These newer models, however, make 
strong assumptions of their own, in particular respecting the methods 
by which the consumers in them become informed and the nuture of 
consumer expectations. Part II of this paper next discusses the 
consequences of making assumptions of this sort; it then argues that 
because of them most search equilibriwn models do not readily yield 
usable policy instruments. Part III then briefly sketches lines of 
research that seem interesting pos itively and that may generate 
helpful no1·mative conclus ions. 
II 
A useful way to begin is with the original and widely cited 
model of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) . These authors suppose that (i) 
finite numbers of firnts and consumers exist; (ii) a homogeneous good 
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is sold and consumed; (i ii) no price discrimination occu rs; (iv) 
consumers de sire to purchn se one unit of the good and will pay any 
price up to a common limit price; (v) consumers have rational 
expectations in that they know the true distribution of prices in a 
market when they begin to search, but do not know which firms charge 
these prices; (vi) consumers fall into two classes, as measured by the 
costs to them of becoming informed, with the low cost group having 
information acquisition cost c1 and the high cost group having cost
c2 , where c2 2. c1 2. O; (vii) be coming informed is viewed as purchasing
and reading a newspaper that reveals the relationship between firms 
and prices; (viii) consumers who become informed always buy at the 
stores that charge the lowest price while consumers who do not become 
informed visit one store chosen at random and buy if the price is less 
than or equal to the 1 imi t price; (ix) firms have U-shaped average 
cost curves; (x) firms maximize profits and in equilibrium earn zero 
expected profits. 
To facilitate comparison of this with other models, we shall 
modify these assumptions in two ways: suppose that (i' ) arbitrarily 
large numbers of consumers and firms exist, with the consumer/firm 
ratio the endogenous vuriable; and (ix ' )  firms' technologies ore 
described by a fixed cost and a marginal cost that is constant up to 
some particular capacity level, after which it becomes infinite. 
To sunuaarize Salop and Stiglitz' s results, introduce the 
following notation: 
* 
PL = the consumers' comMon limit price; p 
competitive price = � + (F/s) , where & = marginal cost, F = f ixed 
the 
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cost, and s = the capacity constraint; a = the proportion of consumers 
with low information acquisition cost (c 1) ,  The Snlop and Stiglitz 
model generates a competitive equilibriwn if and only if enough 
consumers have zero information acquisition costs -- if c1 = 0 and 
a ) 1 - [F/s(pL - p) ), If these two conditions are not met, a number 
of possibilities arise: all firms charge the monopoly price -- it 
never pays any consunier to seek a lower price 
In other cases, there exist two-price equilibria with the low price 
* 
being p and the high price being either PL or a price intermediate 
* 
between p and pL' Finally, plausible cases also occur in which no 
equilibrium exists, 
There are four related difficulties with work of this sort. 
First, the particular rational expectations asswuption used is strong; 
before they begin to search, consur.1ers never know and could not know 
the entire price distribution w1less they also knew the identity of 
the firms charging these prices, Second, the institution by which 
consumers become informed -- buying a newspaper that contains ill 
relevant information -- does not exist. Tilird, nonexistence may occur 
more frequently than the authors suppose because on this model' s 
asswuptions it is unlikely that two distinct groups of consumers will 
exist, Since conswuers are assumed to be identical in all respects 
except analytical ability and the opportunity cost of time, two groups 
of consuraers will exist only if the high cost group has considerably 
less ability than the low cost group to read the newspaper and match 
what they know is the lowest price to the name of the firm that 
6 
charges it, or if the high cost group attaches a much greater value to 
the twenty or so seconds it will take to do this than the low cost 
group does, Ilecause either possibility is implausible, only one 
consumer grou1> actually would exist; everyone in this model would buy 
the newspaper and be perfectly informed or no one would, A11d since 
the authors show that a competitive equilibrium cannot exist when 
c1 > 0, there will either be a monopoly equilibrium -- where 
* 
PL - p < c1 = c2 -- or nonexistence. Fourth, as just noted, the 
rational expectations assumption in this model ensures that a 
degenerate equilibrium at the competitive price cannot exist if all 
consuniers have positive information acquisition costs, This 
conclusion reduces the model's policy significance, Policymakers 
commonly perceive themselves as having to choose between regulating a 
transaction to achieve a desired outcome or reducing search costs to 
improve the outcomes markets will reach. Whether the ''regulation'' 
or ''disclosure'' option should be chosen is in part a function of the 
nature of the equilibria that would be produced if information 
acquisition costs were reduced. These costs never can be reduced to 
zero, and Salop and Stiglitz show that in this case comt>etitive 
equilibria are impossible but do not otherwise indicate what the 
effect of reducing search costs would be, Thus it is difficult to 
draw insights froo1 their theoretically interesting model that would 
illuminate the choice between regulation and disclosure, In addition, 
the model cannot generate criteria which decisionmakers can use to 
characterize observed behavior because it yields nonexistence over 
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relevant ranges of the underlying parameters. 
More recent work has advanced the Salop and Stigl itz analysis; 
however, it too makes strong assumptions about methods of information 
acquisition and about the strategies that some of the economic actors 
pursue. Varian (1980), for example, supposes uninformed consumers to 
visit one store at random and purchase if the price they see equals or 
is less than the limit price, and informed consumers to shop at the 
stores charging the lowest price. Consumers again become informed by 
reading a newspaper that conuaunicates the relationship between firms 
and prices, but the decision to become informed is taken to be 
exogenous. Finally, Varian assumes every firm to have declining 
average costs, with no capacity constraint. Firms are allowed to 
pursue mixed strategies. Thus they may randomly choose a different 
price each period (a ••week'') • If this turns out to be the lowest 
price, tl1e firm sells to its share of the uninformed consumers and all 
the informed; otherwise, it sells only to the uninformed that week and 
loses money, Varian proves the existence of a mixed strategy 
equilibrium in which all prices are charged w ith positive probability, 
from the lowest, where price equals average cost for the successful 
firm that captures all the informed consumers plus its share of the 
ignorant, to the highest, which equals the limit price. 
Tids model relaxes the rational expectations assumption, for 
the wtinformed consumers in it are not assumed to know the price 
distribution, but its assumptions respecting firm costs and the method 
of information acquisition are again unrealistic. So also may be its 
8 
assumption respecting the way firms price, To see why this is so, 
suppose that on Tuesday a firm sends in its ad to the newspaper with 
its price for the foll owing week; on Monday morning of that week the 
newspaper comes out and the firm then learns that it does not have the 
lowest price, It then has an incentive to raise its price to the 
limit price for the rest of the week. TI1e model implicitly assumes 
that such price increases will not be made, but this assumption needs 
justification. Firms adhere to advertised prices because in some 
circumstances they are legally bound to do so and because altering 
advertised prices could cause good w ill losses if consumers commonly 
assume those prices to be fixed for short periods. Consumers in this 
model who visit a firm that is not low for the week, however, have not 
observed the firm's ad; if they had, they would also have observed the 
ad of the lowest priced competitor and gone there, No legal 
prohibition against altering prices on which consumers do not rely 
exists, so it is only the concern for good w ill that would prevent a 
firm from raising its price. But this concern seems weak in the 
context of the model, for consumers who visit a high priced firm by 
definition have not observed its ad and thus would not realize that 
the price they see is higher than the price they might have seen had 
the firm been low for the week; put simply, consumers who see 
''changed'' prices would have no reason to believe they were being 
treated unfairly. Tirn results in Varian's model are sensitive to his 
assumption that firms will not alter advertised prices. If neither 
the law nor the prospect of lost good will are relevant to firms, they 
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would maximize profits by raising prices to the 1 imit in those periods 
when they were not low. This is because conswuers always purchase 
unless the price is above their limit. Thus the equilibrium in this 
model actually could involve all but one firm charging the monopoly 
price in each period. 4 
For these and other reasons, Varian's imaginative model is 
difficult for decisionmakers to apply. It shows that an increase in 
the nwuber of uninformed consumers will cause the average price that 
this group pays to rise, which suggests that welfare gains are 
possible if the state were to make information easier to get, But 
this outcome could obtain only if the firDls that were not low for a 
given week were prohibited from raising their prices, and this may be 
a difficult prohibition to enforce. Also, the model shows that the 
prices paid by informed consumers could decrease with increases in the 
size of the uninformed group, making the welfare effect of legal 
intervention ambiguous. Until these difficulties are resolved, it is 
difficult to distil directives for action from this model.5 
In an important sense, the qualms we have expressed about 
these models are beside the point; the models reflect thoughtful 
attempts to deal with even more serious defects in prior work and 
their authors apparently were not intent on producing analyses that 
would be immediately useful to decisionmakers. Nevertheless, the 
reliance of these search equilibrium models on strong versions of the 
rational expectations assumption combined with their use of imaginary 
ins ti tut ions by which consumers become informed are the source of some 
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difficulty even when the models are taken on their own terms. In 
particular, they seem responsible for the '' discontinuous'' nature of 
the equilibria these models generate, which are of concern 
theoretically, 6 Also, given the great amount of regulation that has
been passed to cure the allegedly harmful effects of imperfect 
information, it now seems useful for economists to address the 
questions that decisionmakers should want answered. The Salop and 
Stiglitz Dlodel and its various extensions thus are best viewed as 
''worst-case'' examples of what may occu r when information acquisition 
costs are positive. A useful next step is to develop models 
intermediate to them and the neoclassical models discussed in the 
introduction to this paper. One way to do this is to weaken further 
the rational expectations assumption and to assume that consumers use 
more realistic methods of information acquisition. 7 
We have developed a model which supposes consumers to learn of 
prices by visiting stores, and to shop pursuant to a fixed sample size 
strategy, with some consumers having sample sizes equalling one and 
others having sample sizes strictly greater than one (Wilde and 
Schwartz, 1979) •8 TI1ese assumptions differ from the standard ones in 
three ways, First, the method of acquiring information is reasonably 
realistic since consumers often do learn of prices by visiting stores. 
Further, the model's qualitative conclusions are unchanged if 
consumers absorb price data from ads. Second, no one in this model is 
perfectly informed, in the sense of knowing the distribution and the 
identity of all firms; rather, consumers only know what their limited 
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samples reveal. Third, the shopping strategy it posits is consistent 
with much of what is known about aptual shopping behavior, since in 
all markets studied some consumers visit one and others more than one 
store, and the ''shoppers'' sometimes return to earlier stores to take 
advantage of favorable prices, 
This model is similar in its assumptions respecting consumer 
preferences and firm technology to the modified version of the Salop 
and Stiglitz model discussed above, The only difference is that a now 
refers to the proportion of comparison shoppers and 11 to the number of 
stores they visit (n 2. 2 ) .  TI1ree qualitatively distinct equilibrium 
configurations emerge in this model: (i) if a significant proportion 
of consumers sample more than one firm, a competitive equilibrium 
occurs--the necessary and sufficient condition for this outcome is 
a 2. 1 - [FI s (pL - p)]; 
9 (ii) if somewhat fewer consumers shop, the 
equilibrium distribution will have a mass point at p*, a gap in which 
no prices are charged and a continuous distribution of prices above 
that to the limit price PL--the necessary and sufficient con<lition for 
this outcome is a <  1 - [F/s(pL - p)] < na/(1 - a +  nu); (iii) if 
still fewer consumers shop, the equilibrium distribution of prices 
will be continuous over some range [p, pL] where p 2. p
*
--the necessary 
and sufficient con<lition for this outcome is a i nu/(1 - a + nu) i 1 
- [F/s(pL - ;)], In this final case, p rises as a falls; prices thus 
begin to mass toward the monopoly price as the percentage of 
comparison shoppers gets small. 
Tilis model suggests that monopolistic competition sometimes is 
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not the appropriate market structure in which to analyze imperfect 
information issues, TI1e standard monopolistically competitive model 
assumes product heterogeneity. In sigh ts drawn from the theory of 
monopolistic competition thus translate uneasily into search 
equilibrium models because these models often assume product 
homogeniety. Some theorists nevertheless have employed this theory to 
characterize market outcomes when information about price is costly to 
acquire in part because of their view, discussed above, that price 
dispersion may be coD1D1on; when dispersion exists, price must exceed 
marginal cost for at least some firms, and this disparity is an 
inevitable feature of monopol istically competitive equilibria, Our 
model, however, makes no presumption that search costs are zero for 
the comparison shoppers, but a classic competitive equilibrium still 
can o btain in it. Tirns it suggests that monopolistic competition is 
not necessa rily the market structure best suited to analyze imperfect 
information problems, at least where homogeniety is assumed. In 
a<ldition, a normative implication of the model is that policymakers 
should consider curing the effects of costly search by reducing the 
costs to consumers of directly comparing purchase alternatives. 
Studies of actual markets suggest that such cost reductions can 
su bstantially lower prices; .!!.•.&•, Devine and Marion (1979). 
Our model nevertheless is quite primitive, Initially, the 
mo<lel was designed to be of some help to decisionmakers in evaluating 
a market's competitive state if goods are homogeneous, but it is 
unilluminating if heterogeneity exists and consumers shop across 
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quality levels or if f irms can price discriminate. Since product 
heterogeneity is more often characteristic of monopolistic competition 
than homogeneity, the pol icy implications of our model would a ppear 
only to be relevant to a small number of markets. Further, the model 
makes the standard but strong assumptions that f irn1s have perf ect 
information about the prices other f irms charge and that consumers 
purchase one good or none; it treats consumers' search strategies as 
exogenously determined; and while it is relatively simple f rom a 
f ormal point of view, it is still diff icult for decisionmakers to 
apply, lo 
III 
The analysis above implies that a useful task, f rom a 
theoretical viewpoint, is to see what equilibria would occur in models 
that drop the rational expectations assumption, assume real world 
methods of inf ormation acqui si ti on and relatively pl aus ibl e consumer 
search stra te gie s and endow f irms with realistic cost f uuct ions. Such 
models would be more likely to illuminate actual phenomena, and might 
provide the basis f or empirical research or laboratory experiments 
that actually could test the eff ects of insuff icient search on 
economic environments. These realistic models would also be helpful 
to policymakers f or the reasons previously given and f or another 
important reason. Decause it is so diff icult to test economic 
theories directly, the attractiveness of a model to decisionmakers 
becomes a f unction of the inherent plaus ibility of the economic story 
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that it tells, and this plaus ibility is itself largely a function of 
the realism of the model's specif ications, Search equilibriwn ntodels 
have not been used by dec isionmakers in part because of the strength 
of the assur.1ptions they have made. 
A policy focus also suggests relaxing the homogeniety 
assumption, Tilis is because a crucial question, when price dispersion 
is observed, is whether it is a function of insuff icient search, which 
suggests ineff iciency, or of heterogeniety. We have recently 
developed a model in which goods of two qualities are sold and 
consumers have very imprecise inf ormation respecting the prices and 
qualities that obtain at any given f irm. (Schwartz and W ilde, 1981) 
In consequenc_e, the consumers are assumed to shop randomly across 
quality levels, The model characterizes necessary and suff icient 
conditions for both goods to trade at their competitive prices, Tilis 
model yields throe results: (i) heterogeneous goods markets are more 
l ikely to segment into roughly homogeneous subsets than is commonly 
supposed; (ii) when markets do not segment, heterogeniety can work to 
dilute the eff ectiveness of search, since, for example, a consumer who 
visits two stores that sell diff erent qualities is in eff ect a 
nonshopper f or both varieties; (iii) increases in quality dens ity, 
sample sizes held constant, reduce the likelihood of competitive 
equilibria, since search becomes dissipated by the range of 
qual ities, 11 Tilis model nevertheless only begins to explore the 
implications of heterogc niety, Its major failing, f rom a policy 
perspective, is that it f ails to characterize equilibria intermediate 
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between competitive and monopoly, and thus it is unhelpful to 
decisionmakers who want to know whether a particular heterogeneous 
goods market is behaving well or badly. An important next step, then, 
is for search equilibrium models formally to incorporate product and 
contra ct term heter oge ne i ty. 12
Finally, the economic analysis to date has been of limited use 
to policymakers be ca use the formal models de al only with search goods, 
all of whose properties are observable before purchase. f.!uch 
regulation, however, deals with goods or services that have experience 
or credence qualities. 'Il1e best formal treatment of this case is 
found in Satterthwaite (1979). This paper analyzes a model of the 
medical services market and shows how an increase in the supply of 
physicians can cause prices to rise because the supply increase 
reduces the effectiveness of consumer search. Extending 
Satterthwaite' s model or developing new models to deal with experience 
goods would obviously be useful. 
r.v 
Economists have sought to describe markets characterized by 
the existence of costly information, and decisionmakers, assuming 
these markets to be badly behaved, have been regulating them 
extensively. Neither group has profited much from the other. Tilis is 
due in part to the usual indifference of real world regulators to 
theoretical work, and in part to the economists' justifiable focus on 
questions of theoretical rather than immediately practical 
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significance. Nevertheless, that regulation should become more 
informed seems incontrovertible. We suggest that search equilibrium 
models would be of greater interest both positively and normatively if 
their assumptions were made more realistic and if their authors at 




• California Institute of Technology; University of Southern 
California Law Center 
u California Institute of Technology 
This paper has benefited greatly from the co1DL1ents and suggestions of 
Edward Green, Mary O' Keeffe, Jennifer Reinganum and James Strnad, 
Our work was supported by NSF Grant No. DAR-8016066 
1. Sal op (1976) , p. 2 40 (emphasis in o riginal) 
2 .  The empirical literature respecting the existence of price 
dispersion is weak. As an example, Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser 
reported finding substantial price dispersion in consumer markets for 
' ' relatively standardized products' ' on the basis of telephone 
surveys, but the authors recognized that they did not control closely 
for product heterogeniety and their survey failed to eliminate the 
possible effects of term heterogeniety or price discrimination. 'The 
latter is repo rted to be a common phenomenon in markets for some of 
the products they considered. See Maynes (1976) , p. 152 . Also, some 
evidence is contrary to the price dispersion assumption, The most 
commonly traded homogeneous goods are comntodi ties, raw materials and 
money. TI1e former two are often traded on exchanges, where no 
dispersion exists for identical goods sold under identical terms, And 
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relatively little price dispersion unaccounted for by term 
heterogeniety or different levels of risk seems to exist in consumer 
credit markets. Sec Schwartz and Wilde (1979) . Thus the extent of 
price dispersion in homogeneous goods markets is an open question. 
3. An interesting exception is Beales, Craswell and Salop (1981) . 
4. This argument is similar to one recently advanced by Diamond and 
llothschild (1978) in their alternative formulation of the Sal op and 
Stiglitz model. They argue that a firm should ignore its effect on 
the average price charged in the market. In the context of the Salop 
and Stiglitz model, this means that in equilibrium the only prices 
charged will be the competitive price and the monopoly price since any 
firm which is not charging the lowest price should charge the monopoly 
price. Diamond and Rothschild al so introduce a continuum of 
information acquisition costs. Together, these modifications 
eliminate some of the undesirable features of the Salop and Stiglitz 
model, but still can never yield more than two prices in equilibrium. 
5. In a recent paper, Bagnoli (1980) generalizes the Salop and 
Stiglitz and Vari11n work in a model that supposes uninformed consumers 
� 
to have infinite sonrch costs and informed consumers to have zero 
search costs--and thus to know everything; and assumes firms to have 
declining average costs to a particular point and then to have a flat 
average cost curve over all further increases in output. Tilis model 
is a useful confirmation of the earlier analyses, but does not address 
the comments just made, 
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6, The problem is that small changes in information acquisition costs 
can produce drastically different ,equilibrium price distributions or 
even nonexistence, 
7, A recent 1 i tera ture has developed that analyzes dynamic models of 
''matching'' processes under imperfect information-- see Mortensen 
(1979) , Diamond and Uaskin (1979, 1981) and Butters (1980) . TI1ese 
models analyze markets in which large numbers of ''traders'' meet 
randomly to exchange a single unit of some homogeneous good. While 
they are very interesting, these models do not focus on the more 
standard kinds of markets with which we are concerned, 
8. We justify use of a fixed sample size strategy in IV ilde and 
Schwartz (1979) and Schwartz and Wilde (1979) . 
9. TI1e necessary and sufficient condition for a competitive 
equilibrium in our model is identical to that in the (revised) Salop 
and Stiglitz model, if c1 = o . The Salop and Stiglitz model, however, 
has the peculiar property that when a ) 1 - [F(s/pL - 'P>l and 
0 < c1 < c 2 , there is a range of costs over which no equilibrium 
exists, and when c1 is large enough to generate au equilibrium, it is 
degenerate at the monopoly price. When the condition 
a ) 1 - [F(s/pL p)] is unsatisfied, no competitive equilibrium can 
occur in either model. 
10, Paranjape and Wilde (1981) do relax the strong purchase and cost 
assumptions in our model to allow for downward sloping demand curves 
and U-shaped average cost curves. They show that the qualitative 
conclus ions of the earlier model are unaffected. Also, it turns out 
that markets are more likely to be competitive the more elastic the 
demand curve aud the less elastic the average cost curve. A similar 
generalization of the Sal op and Stigl i tz model can be found in 
Draverman (1980) . 
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11. This result reinforces Satterthwaite (1979) , who showed, in a 
very different analytical framewo1·k, how an increase in the number of 
sellers of a differentiated service could cause prices for that 
service to rise, 
12. Chan and Leland (1980) have recently extended the Salop and 
Stiglitz model to incorporate quality differences between firms. This 
is a difficult problem, and while Chan and Leland's model is a move 
toward greater realism, it still suffers from many of the underlying 
problems of the Sal op aud Stigl i tz model. 
2 1  
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